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MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 
VOL. XVI. MAY, x918 
BRITISH WAR CABINETS. 
No. 7. 
DURING the progress of the present world war there has been a remarkable series of developments in the British Cabinet 
and. ministry, involving not only many changes of personnel 
but also fundamental alterations in the constitution of the Cabinet 
and its relations to Parliament. An analysis of these is not only of 
interest as an important phase of the history of the war, and the 
evolution of political mstitutions ; but is also of value in dealing with 
problems and proposals for governmental reorganization in the 
United States. 
THE LIBERAL CABINET 
At the outbreak of the war a Liberal Cabinet was in office, with 
the Rt. Hon. Henry H. Asquith as Prime Minister. But the position 
of this Cabinet differed from that of the conventional description 
of British institutions, in that the Liberal party did not have a ma-
jority in the House of ·commons. Indeed the two leading parties-
Liberals and Unionists-were practically equal in numbers. But 
the Liberal Cabinet 'vas ordinarily supported by the minor parties, 
the Irish Nationalists and the Labour members. 
Several Cabinet changes took place on the declaration of war. 
The Prime Minister was temporarily serving as Secretary of State 
for War; and this position was promptly given to Lord Kitchener, 
the best known military commander in the country, but a man with-
out experience as a Cabinet member or in active political work, and 
not identified with any political party. This appointment involved 
a departure from established customs in two respects,-in admitting 
to the Cabinet a non-party· member, and in placing a military officer 
at the head "of the War Office. 
At the same time two members of the Cabinet and one under-
secretary resigned, because of their objection to taking an active 
part in the conduct of war. These were Viscount Morley, Lord 
President of the Council; John Burns, President of the Local Gov-
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ernment Board; and C. P. Trevelyan, undersecretary of the Board 
of Education. 
Outside of the ministry, Ramsey MacDonald resigned his position 
as chairman of the parliamentary Labour Party, because his views 
on war were in conflict with the attitude of his party in supporting 
the war policy of the government. 
While the Cabinet remained substantially a Liberal Cabinet, a 
party truce was promptly agreed to, on the basis of postponing action 
on controversial party q~estions. A letter from Bonar Law, leader 
of the Opposition Unionists, to the Prime Minister, assuring him of 
the support of his party, was published. The customary methods 
of parliamentary opposition and criticism in the House of Commons 
were thus suspended; and for some months the chief and almost the 
only parliamentary criticism of the government was that voiced by 
individual members in the House of Lords. 
Under these conditions a large amount of emergency legislation 
was rapidly passed in the six weeks between the declaration of war 
and the adjournment of the regular session on September 18; and 
this was further supplemented at an adjourned session later in the 
year 1914, and at the sessions in the following years. 
Early in the session of 1915, action was taken which emphasized 
the control of the Cabinet over the proceedings in Parliament. On 
February 3 the government proposed a resolution taking the whole 
time of the House of Commons for its measures until further notice. 
"This drastic proceeding was accepted almost as a matter of course. 
But it deserves to be noted as a prominent landmark in parliamen-
tary history. For though the so-called 'parliamentary initiative' has 
often fallen into practical desuetude, this is probably the first occa-
sion in the history of any Parliament in which it has been formally 
surrendered for an indefinite period."1 ' 
Another significant change in procedure at this session was that 
the enormous votes of credit for war purposes now absorbed the 
ordinary estimates for the army and navy. In every previous war, 
including the Napoleonic wars, the votes of credit have represented 
roughly the oifference between war expenditure and n0rmal peace 
expenditure. But the army and navy estimates were now dispensed 
with altogether, except for 'token' estimates of £1000 for each vote 
and £100 for each appropriation in aid, as a matter of form ; and 
both normal and abnormal expenditures were to be met out of votes 
of credit.2 
1 Tlie Political Quarterly, No. 6 (May, 1915), pp. 141.°, 163. 
' Ibid, pp. l 46-7. 
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As the session of 1915 continued, evidence of uneasiness and dis-
satisfaction appeared both inside and outside of Parliament. The 
Cabinet still received general support, and there was no open attempt 
to force its retirement. But the policy of the Cabinet. lacked sta-
bility and certainty. "Where the people looked for leadership, they 
found the old inclination to wait and see."3 "In the all important 
matter of munitions, the Government confused and irritated the 
House by alternate complacency and panic; in the matter of liquor 
they embarked on an ill-considered venture, which led to inglorious 
surrender; in the matter of alien enemies they were forced into a 
reversal of policy by popular effervescence. These mishaps did not 
bring about the change of government, but they went far to con-
vince the doubtful that a change was inevitable."4 The resignation 
of Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, on May 15, 
brought to light the internal difficulties of the Government; and 
helped to precipitate the crisis. 
No formal action in Parliament preceded the change of govern-
ment ; and what took place in private and informal conferences will 
not be fully known for some time. But it has been understood that 
the Unionist leaders informed Mr. Asquith that they could no 
longer maintain their attitude of restraining criticism unless impor-
tant changes were made. As an outcome, a reorganization of the 
Cabinet was agreed to, Mr. Asquith remaining as Prime Minister, 
but with the admission of a number of Unionist and Labour mem-
bers, forming a Coalition.Cabinet. The Irish Nationalists were also 
offered representation; but declined to serve so long as Home Rule 
for Ireland was not put into effect. 
THE COALITION CABINET 
When formally constituted the new Coalition Cabinet consisted 
of 12 Liberals, 8 Unionists, I Labour member and Lord Kitchener, 
a total of 22 members, an iucrease of 2 over the old Cabinet. The 
new positions were the newly created Minister of Munitions and 
Lord Lansdowne, as Minister without portfolio. Unionists were 
assigned to a number of important departments : A. J. Balfour be-
came First Lord of the Admiralty; Bonar Law, Secretary for the 
Colonies; Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India; W. H. 
Long, President of the Local Government Board; and Edward Car-
son, Attorney General. Liberal members were shifted to different 
s The Times History and E11cyclotetlia of tlie War. V, ch. 90, p. 319. 
•Tire Polit1cal Quarterly, No. 7 (;).!arch, 1916), p. 122. 
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posts: Lloyd George was transferred to the new Ministry of Muni-
tions; Reginald McKenna became Chancellor of the Exchequer; 
J_ohn Simon, Secretary of State for Home Affairs; Lord Buckmas-
ter, Lord Chancellor; Lord Crewe, President of the Council; Lord 
Selborne, President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries; and 
Winston Churchill was given the sinecure post of Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster. In February, 1916, an addition was made to 
the Cabinet, by creating a new Ministry of Blockade. 
A Coalition Cabinet of this kind was something new in British 
political history. There have been coalition cabinets before.; but 
they had been only partial, and none had gone to the extent of ab-
sorbing nearly all the chief political leaders of the different parties, 
representing 88 per cent of the House of Commons, and thus elim-
inating the organized Opposition. Mr. Asquith, writing to the Chief 
Liberal Whip, said of the new arrangements : 
"The transformation implies a temporary abandonment of the 
system of party government which has ever since 1832 dominated 
our political arrangements and which I hold to be, under normal con-
ditions, the best adapted to our national requirements. * * * There 
is one reason and one only which could justify or explain such a 
new departure-a clear and urgent case of national necessity :"5 
The general result was, however, called by one writer a combina-
tion of Front Bench politicians rather than a national Cabinet in the 
wider sense. But the same critic considered it a definite and most 
necessary step in replacing party government by a government for 
war. It was undoubtedly stronger than the preceding Liberal Cab-
inet ; but it was "too much to expect that it would show itself per-
manently more efficient than its predecessor." Its membership "was 
limited to the politicians, and party considerations were still the 
basis of its composition;" and "it was likely to suffer, even more 
than its predecessor from its own unwieldy bulk, which necessarily 
hampered the swift decisions of a Cabinet in time of war."8 
Such a sweeping reconstruction of the Cabinet and Ministry, un-
der the established law and practice, would have necessitated a con-
siderable number of bye-elections, to permit the newly appointed 
Ministers to retain their seats in the House of Commons. But as 
there was general agreement that it was inadvisable to hold elections, 
an act was passed suspending the law which prevented members of 
the House from accepting office. 
•The Times History ancl Encyclopedia of the War. V, ch. 90, p. 316. 
•Ibid, pp. 314, 320. 
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Later, as the statutory limit for the duration of the House of Com-
i;nons, under the Pa;rliament Act of 19n, approached, a bill was in-
troduced and passed extending the life of the existing House for a 
few months; and similar measures have subsequently l:ieen enacted 
from time' to time, so as to avoid a parliamentary election during 
the war. Local elections have also been suspended in the same way, 
The Coalition Cabinet promptly gave evidence of a more energetic 
policy, in measures for the creation of the new Ministry of Muni-
tions and the Munitions of War Act, and in the administrative con-
duct of the war. But disappointments as to the successful progress 
of both military and diplomatic affairs led to gradually increasing 
dissatisfaction and criticism. Paradoxically the disappearance of 
any formally organized opposition was followed by more openly ex-
pressed opposing, not enough to be formidable, but troublesome 
guerilla attacks, from a small group of doctrinaire Radicals and 
avowed Socialists. Moreover the growing feeling of unrest was 
much broader than the avowed opposition. 
It was urged that the Coalition government was defective because 
of the size of the Cabinet, its composition and the character of the 
Prime Minister. Members of all parties acknowledged that the Cab-
inet was too large for the most effective action. "A body of 23 
men of very unequal ability, tired by their departmental labours, and 
meeting every few days for a couple of hours, was, indeed, an im-
possible machinery for making war."7 As early as September, 1915, 
the London Times advocated a smaller Cabinet, meeting every day, 
and relieved from departmental detail. 
In fact the traditional working· of the British Cabinet system had 
already been altered in important respects. The public suspected. 
that specific problems were ref erred formally to Cabinet committees 
and that the active direction of affairs was in the hands of a small 
group within the Cabinet. But there was no definite knowledge of 
the extent of the control of the Cabinet over its committees or over 
the de facto directing group. 
The War Committee 
On November 2, 1915, the Prime Minister announced that since 
the beginning of the war there had been something like fifty different 
committees and advisory bodies formed out of the Cabinet, though 
sometimes with outside assistance. Of special importance had been 
TJbid. X, ch. 163, p. 328. 
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a fluctuating body to which, by the consent of the Cabinet, questions 
of state and questions of strategy had been delegated. This War 
Committee was now to be established on a more formal basis and to 
be limited to five or six members, including the Prime Minister, the 
Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the 
Minister of Munitions, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This committee should have a 
staff of naval, military and diplomatic advisors and have the general 
direction of war measures. The Cabinet at large was to be kept in-
formed of its decisions and to be consulted before any new departure 
in policy was undertaken. 8 
This announcement gave some satisfaction, as a step in the right 
direction, though criticized because the committee was composed of 
department heads who would be occupied with departmental prob-
lems. Two members of the Cabinet resigned: Mr. Carson, because 
he was not satisfied with the Balkan policy, and Mr. Churchill, as 
he was omitted from the war committee. 
In June, 1916, the size of the war committee was increased to 
seven by the addition of Lord Curzon,-at the time when Mr. Lloyd 
George became Secretary of War and Mr. Montagu succeeded him 
as Minister of Munitions. The balance of parties in the committee 
was thus preserved. In practice the Cabinet almost automatically 
ratified the decisions of the committee; but the committee itself grad-
ually expanded by the presence of official advisors and ministerial 
visitors until it became almost as cumbrous a body as the Cabinet.0 
Further dissatisfaction developed with the acknowledged failure 
of the Dardanelles expedition and the internal conflict in the Cab-
inet on the question of compulsory military service. A preliminary 
step in this latter direction had been taken by the passage of the 
National Registration Act in June, 1915. But the first compulsory 
service act, for unmarried men, was not introduced until January, 
r916. This led to the resignation of Sir John Simon, Home Secre-
tary; and for a short time the active opposition of the Labour and 
Irish Nationalists in Parliament appeared probable; but the Labour 
Ministers were persuaded to withdraw their resignations, and the 
Nationalists adopted a neutral policy of inaction, since the measure 
was not to apply to Ireland. 
Proposals to e>...i:end the application of conscription developed fur-
ther disagreement in the Cabinet, and when a compromise measure 
s The Political Quarterly, No. 8 (Sept., 1916), p. xo4. Cf. The Committee on Im-
perial Defence, p: 482. 
9 Tlie Times History and Encyclopec!iu. of the War. X, ch. x63, p. 354-
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was presented at a secret session of the House of Commons on 
":.'\pril 25, so much dissatisfaction was disclosed that the proposed 
bill was withdrawn and a more sweeping measure introduced early 
in May. . 
The hesitancy and delay in dealing with this and other problems 
led to a growing demand for a more positive leadership in the gov-
ernment. As one writer stated: "A coalition government above all 
others should avoid the appearance of sectional and merely depart-
mental activity. In other words the. Prime Minister should show 
beyond the shadow of a doubt that he is the active director of affairs. 
It is therefore unfortunate that he seemed during these few weeks 
to withdraw himself from the eye of the House of Commons."10 
But it should also be noted that the principle upon which the coali-
tion was based called for a general agreement on all important ques-
tions of pqlicy; and to have forced a decision against any consider-
able minority would have involved a reconstruction of the Cabinet. 
In spite of these difficulties the Coalition Cabinet continued in 
office, with minor changes, for a year and a half, until December, 
i9I6. Its record has been summed up in these words: "The Coali-
tion government proved in almost every sphere of war direction and 
war administration that it was stronger than its predecessor, but not 
strong enough, that it acted more swiftly, but yet acted too late, that 
its measures were better adapted to the needs of the time than the 
measures of the first year of the war, but yet were almost invariably 
half measures."11 
THE LI,OYD GEORGE WAR CABINET AND MINISTRY 
Towards the end of the year I9I6 there was another general re-
construction of the British Cabinet and Ministry, involving not only 
numerous changes in personnel but fundamental alterations in the 
structure of the Cabinet and in its relations to the House of Com-
mons. 
As in the case of the reorganization of May, I9I5, the change 
was not ·preceded by any formal vote of the House of Commons ; 
but it was the result of criticism outside of Parliament and internal 
disagreement within the Coalition Cabinet. Dissatisfaction had been 
growing more acute on a number of important problems, including 
the most effective distribution of "man power," the reorganization 
of the admiralty, more active control over shipping, and questions 
of food production and control. The London Times became more 
>0 The Political Quarterly, No. 7 (March, 1916), p. 146. 
11 The Times History and Encyclopedia of the War. X, ch. 163, p. 325. 
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active in demanding a sweeping reorganization in methods of ad-
ministration. 
Within the Cabinet the crisis developed on the question of 
administrative reorganization. Plans were proposed for reducing 
the size of the war com~ittee and giving it more definite authority, 
without the need for consulting the whole Cabinet. This might have 
been agreed to without a general recasting of the Cabinet but for the 
specific proposal that the Prime Minister should not be a member of 
the war committee. It was inevitable that Mr. Asquith should not 
agree to this ; and when an attempted compromise failed, Mr. Lloyd 
George resigned. 'fhis was promptly followed by the resignation of 
Mr. Asquith, which necessarily involved the whole Cabinet. 
On Asquith's resignation, the King first turned to Mr. Bonar Law, 
the recognized leader of the Unionist party, as Mr. Asquith was of 
the Liberal party. But in a short time Mr. Law reported that he 
could not form a satisfactory Ministry. Mr. Lloyd George was then 
called on; and after two days presented his proposed Cabinet and 
Ministry, which then took office. 
The War Cabinet 
In the new ministry the most striking feature was the disappear-
ance of the traditional Cabinet of department heads, and the creation 
of a distinctly new type of War Cabinet of five members. This took 
over the active functions of the former war committee; but instead 
of being subordinate to the Cabinet, was to be the superior directing 
body over the whole group of ministers. This War Cabinet was 
composed of Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister; Lord Curzon, 
President of the Council; Lord Milner and Mr. Arthur Henderson, 
Ministers without portfolio; and Mr. Bonar Law, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. Only the last 
named held an important administrative office; and this cabinet of 
five were to give their entire time to the general problems of the 
war. 
Executive power and responsibility were thus concentrated in the 
small body of five men, in place of the unwieldy Cabinet of 23 ad-
ministrative officers who were also active leaders in Parliament. 
But this was accomplished by attempting to separate the functions, 
formerly combined in the Cabinet, of executive control, both from 
the active leaderl!hip of Parliament and from· the immediate dfrec-
tion of administrative action. The Prime Minister ceased to be the 
active leader ·of the House of Commons, and attended but rarely. In 
a few months Bonar Law retired from the War Cabinet, leaving no 
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member of that body whose regular attendance at the House was 
to be expected. 
· The concentration of authority seems to have been generally ap-
proved ; but there were differences of opinion as to the form, and as 
to its effect in the future. One writer remarked : "Everyone expect-
ed a much smaller Cabinet; few imagined that he would cut it down 
to Five. Twenty-three was a monstrosity, for which there was no 
excuse and no palliation save that the party politicians· could not 
bridle their ambitions. A Cabinet of Five can be justified only as a 
temporary war measure, and leaves the perpetual problem of Inner 
and Outer Cabinet untouched."12 
On the other hand, another observer has written : "The time im-
peratively calls for government by a single man, assisted by the 
ablest e:>..-perts. ':' * * The idea of governing a country by a commit-
tee of men who must be unanimous in all their decisions, whether 
they numb.er twenty-three or five is monstrous. After all joint re-
sponsibility in accordance with Cabinet fiction means irresponsibility. 
'1\venty-three men, and even five men, cannot think and resolve alike 
in all matters. * * * Although it may be thought that a war com-
mittee of five able, honest, energetic men, who are equally deter-
mined to win the war, is an ideal body for exercising the supreme 
control, a dictatorship * * ~, is inevitable. * * * The logic of events 
must place the. conduct of the war into the hands of a single man, 
although his supremacy may be disguised by giving him a number 
of colleagues, who in reality should be his subordinates. War gov:. 
ernment by debating society is gone probably forever."13 
In connection with this feature of the new War Cabinet, notice 
m:iy be taken of the nature of changes in some of the other countries. 
In France there has also been a small war committee or council cre-
ated; but this has been composed of the heads of the administrative 
departments most directly involved in the conduct of the war; while 
parliamentary commissions have actively cooperated with the Cab-
inet. In Germany, where the Chancellor has been nominally the 
sole minister, but whose authority has apparently been limited by 
the decisions of the heads of the military departments, there have 
been some steps taken towards at least the form of consultation with 
the Reichstag and a committee of that body. 
Besides the concentration of authority, it may also be noted that 
the new War Cabinet, unlike the former Cabinet and like the war 
committee, while meeting in private, appears to have formal recor~s 
12 Auditor Tantum, in Fortnightly Review, Jan., 1917, pp. 42·3. 
11 Politicus, in Fortnightly Re~iew, Jan., 1917, pp. 22-3. 
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taken of its proceedings, and has also its own staff of assistants and 
experts, distinct from those of the administrative departments.u 
Difficult problems may ·arise when the recommendations of these 
staff advisers of the \Var Cabinet conflict with those of the adminis-
trative departments. Will the staff advisers of the War Cabinet be 
more important than the Ministers? 
The Ministry 
The formation of the new War Cabinet did not abolish the min-
isterial positions at the head of the administrative departments. But 
it materially altered the status of the ministers ; and other impor-
tant changes were made in the constitution of the ministry. 
In the matter of party representation both the \Var Cabinet and 
the Ministry preserved the form of a Coalit!on. In the War Cab-
inet, Mr. Lloyd George was a Liberal, Mr. Henderson a Labour 
member, and the other three were Unionists. In the larger minis-
try, the number of Unionists and Labour members was increased; 
and while there was a considerable number of Liberal ministers, none 
of the most prominent Liberal members of the Asquith Cabinets re-
mained in office. Moreover there was a significant appearance of 
men of business rather than parliamentary experience, some of 
whom could not be definitely assigned to any of the regular parties. 
The new government was thus a coalition including more than party 
elements. 
On the other hand, the organization of the new ministry was fol-
lowed by the reappearance of a formal opposition. Mr. Asquith 
and his leading supporters took their seats in the Opposition benches, 
where their attitude towards the government has been similar to that 
of the Unionists towards the Liberal Cabinet during the first period 
of the war. 
While the new Cabinet was much smaller than the old, the new 
Ministry was larger. A series of new Ministers was appointed, and 
provision was made later for new departments, and a considerable 
addition was made to the number of parliamentary secretaries, both 
in the old and new departments. The new ministries included min-
isters of Labour and Pensions, a Food Controller and a Shipping 
Controller. An Air Board was also created, the Presidency of 
which was, however, assigned to the under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. Later additional ministers of National Service and 
Reconstruction were appointed. 
"There were 40 paid members of the Secretariat o~ the War Cabinet. Parliamentary 
Debates, 1917, Vol. 91: 598. 
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Altogether the new ministry fom1ed a total of 88, nearly double 
that of pre-war ministries. Of these 60 were members of the House 
of Commons, 23 were members of the House of Lords, and 5 were 
not members of either House.15 The influence of 60 salaried offi-
cials of the ministry as members of the House of Commons may well 
become an appreciable factor in contjolling a majority of votes in 
that House to sustain the government. 
The declining importance of the House of Commons is further 
indicated by the lack of attention given to it not only by the members 
of the War Cabinet but also by the ministers. This is indicated by 
the number of ministers not members of either House, these depart-
ments being represented only by undersecretaries. But even the 
ministerial members· of the House have often been absent. It was 
pointed out that during the debate on a Consolidated Fund Bill, 
there was no one on the Government Front Bench except a Junior 
Lord of the Treasury and later the Chief Secretary for Ireland.16 
Under these circumstances attendance and interest in the proceed-
ings of Parliament have declined. Important bills have been dis-
cussed on behalf of the government by comparatively unknown men. 
The most prominent speakers have been former Liberal ministers, 
formally in opposition, who after presenting their arguments do not 
appear on the division lists. The second reading vote on a New 
Ministries Bill (to establish the Ministry of Reconstruction) was 
carried by a vote of only 92 Ayes to 30 Noes. 
More than one British writer has publicly called the new govern-
mental arrangements a constitutional revolution. The general re-
sults have been summed up in these words, by Sidney Low: 
"For the ministerial and administrative Cabinet collectively re-
sponsible to Parliament, officered and recruited entirely from the 
Parliamentary circle, intimately related to the House of Commons, 
framed on rigid party lines, and conferring with absolute secrecy, 
we have a Cabinet which is not a Ministry and a Ministry which is 
not a Cabinet; a Cabinet which directs but does not administer; a 
Ministry which has exchanged collective responsibility for individ-
ual responsibility; a Cabinet which has a very loose connection with 
the House of Commons, and for some purposes is virtually independ-
ent of it; which stands outside our party divisions; which admits 
to its confid~ntial deliberations representatives of all the great States 
of ~he Empire as well as those of the United Kingdom; .and which 
:11 Herbert Samuel, in Parliamentary Debates, 1917, Vol. 96: 1609. 
1s Parliamentary Debates, i917, Vol. 92: 1337. 
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still holds private, but no longer in the strictest sense secret, meet-
ings. 
"Like most revolutions it is really the result of a long process of 
evolution. * * * The Inner Cabinet had long existed in a more or 
le~s unacknowledged form. Mr. Asquith regularized the Inner.Cab-
inet and gave it definite status as the War Cabinet, and he made a 
step towards abolishing theTsecret conclave by providing this com-
mittee with a secretary. 
"Parliamentary control had persisted in form, but had been sen-
sibly relaxed. The war which conferred quasi-autocratic authority 
on the Executive diminished it still further; and the formation of 
the Coalition reduced it to a shadow. This also went far to release 
the Cabinet from the party system and paved the way for a govern-
ment in which that system is ignored."17 
Still another constitutional development of first importance, not 
only for the government of the United Kingdom but for the loose 
aggregate of British governments vaguely styled the British Empire, 
was the sessions in the spring of 1917 of what was called the Im-
perial Cabinet. This was from one point 9f view an expansion of 
the War Cabinet formed in December, 1916; but in other respects 
may be considered to have developed from an earlier cabinet com-
mittee on imperial defense. 
Committee on Imperial Defense 
In 1895 a national defense committee of the cabinet had been set 
up, with the Prime Minister as chairman. In 1904, after the South 
African war, this was reorganized by the Balfour administration as 
a committee on imperial defense. As reconstituted this consisted of 
the Prime Minister as Chairman; the Secretaries of State for Y..lar, 
Foreign Affairs, India an!l the Colonies; the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer; the First Lord of the Admiralty; the Chief of the General 
Staff; the First Sea Lord; the Directors of Naval and Military In-
telligence, with Viscount Esher and Field Marshal Lord Nicholson. 
Other high imperial and colonial officials were called into the coun-
cil as occasion required. Records were kept of its conclusions and 
of the reasons on which they were based.18 
The establishment of this committee was· formally approved by 
the House of Commons. While it in no way limited the responsi· 
bility of the Cabinet as a whole, it provided machinery by which the 
military policy of the country might be, so far as possible, contin-
i1 Fortnightly Review, Feb., 1917, pp. 214-5. 
is Constitutional Year Book, 1916, pp. 20, 67. 
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uous, and based upon the authority of the most competent experts. 
. Sessions of this committee were held during the Imperial Confer-
ences of 1909 and 1912; and in the latter year Mr. Asquith explained 
its organization to the House of Commons. The full coi;nmittee met 
on an average six or seven times a year. There were four perma-
nent committees in constant session: on home ports defense, on over-
seas defense, on the co-ordination of action at the outbreak of war, 
and on air matters. There were also other committees on internal 
and overseas transport, wireless telegraphy, maintenance of com-
merce and censorship in time of war. After this s~atement ano.ther 
sub-committee was organized on possible invasions or raids.19 
This committee had been active in formulating military policy and 
making plans and preparations for war. With the outbreak of the 
present war, its activities increased, and its membership tended to 
enlarge. A list of those who usually attended the meetings in 1915 
includes, besides those noted above, the Minister of Munitions, the 
Lord President of the Council, the permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, the Second Sea Lord of the Admiralty, 
the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, the Director of Military Op-
erations, the Inspector General of Overseas Forces, and Admirals 
Lord Fisher and A. K. Wilson,-making a total of about twenty.20 
From its membership this committee must have dealt to a large 
extent with questions of administration and the.execution of policy. 
The Imperial Cabinet 
Some steps taken earlier in the war foreshadowed the Imperial 
Cabinet of 1917. In July, 1915, a meeting of the Cabinet was at-
tended by Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada. In March, 
1916, a Cabinet meeting was attended by Mr. W. M. Hughes, Prime 
Minister of Australia, who had come to Great Britain, after recent 
conferences with the prime ministers of New Zealand and Canada.21 
These two isolated, and apparently unpremeditated incidents pre-
pared the way for the more general admission of representatives of 
the dominions to the Cabinet. 
In December, 1916, after the formation of the Lloyd George Cab-
inet and Ministry, the British government invited the_govemments 
of the overseas dominions and India to a special war conference, in 
connection with which there should be held a continuous series of 
10 Parliamentary Debates, sth series. Vol. 42: 1385; TT1e Political Quarterly, No. 5, 
pp. 67-8. 
"°British Imperial Calendar, 1916, p. 365. 
01 The Times Histor;,• and Enc;,oclopedia of the War. X, ch. 163, p. 341. 
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meetings of the new \Var Cabinet, of which for this conference the 
prime ministers of t_he dominions should be members. 
The Conference was held during March and April, including rep-
resentatives from Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand and ~outh 
Africa, and also from India. All the self-governing dominjons .were 
represented, except Australia, where a parliamentary election re-
quired the presence of the leading ministers at home. The Secretary 
of State for the Colonies presided; and other ministers and perma-
nent officials of the United Kingdom attended, but not the Prime 
Minister nor other members of the War Cabinet. This Conference 
considered political and commercial matters of joint concern; its 
proceedings were reported and, in part, made public; but like previ-
ous Imperial Conferences it was only an advisory body with no pos-
itive authority.22 
During the same period, meeting as a rule on alternate days to the 
Imperial Conference, were held the sessions of the Imperial War 
Cabinet. This included the Prime Minister and the other members 
of the War Cabinet; the Secretaries of State for India and the Col-
onies; and also Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada; Wm. 
Massey and Joseph Ward, Premier and Finance Minister of New 
Zealand; Sir Edward Morris from Newfoundland; General-Smuts 
from South Africa; and the Maharajah of Bikanir and Sir S. P. 
Sinha from India. The representatives of India and the dominions 
were not merely witnesses and advisers, but in effect ministers with-
out portfolio, deliberating under the privy councillor's oath. 
No official report of the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet has been 
published; but it was announced that at the final session the Prime 
Minister proposed that meetings of an Imperial Cabinet should be 
held annually, or at any intermediate time when matters of urgent 
imperial concern require to be settled. "The Imperial Cabinet will 
consist of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such of 
his colleagues as deal specially with imperial affairs, of the Prime 
Minister of each of the dominions, or of some specially accredited 
alternate possessed of equal authority, and of a representative of 
the Indian people to be appointed by the government of India."23 
In the concluding resolutions of the Imperial Conference, it was 
voted that the readjustment of constitutional relations of the British 
governments should be postponed to a special Imperial Conference 
to be called after the war; and "that any such readjustment, while 
thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and 
"'Sidney Low, in Nineteenth Century, August, 1917, p. 234-
23 J. B. Firth, in Fonnighlly Review, August, 1917, p. 197· 
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complete ·control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full 
recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth and of India as an important portion of the same, 
should recognize their right to an adequate voice in foreign policy 
and in foreign relations and should provide effective arrangements 
for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Im-
perial concern and for such necessary concerted action founded on 
consultation as the several Governments may determine." 
These developments mark important steps in the reconstruction of 
the Constitution, both of the United Kingdom and what has been 
formally called the British "Imperial Commonwealth." 
So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it indicates a further 
departure from the collective responsibility of the Cabinet to the 
House of Commons. The connection of the House with the new.War 
Cabinet is but slight. The House did not vote Mr. Asquith out; nor 
did it vote.in Lloyd George and his associates. But if the House of 
Commons has been losing control over the Cabinet of the United 
Kingdom, how much less likely is it to control the new Imperial 
Cabinet? How can the British Parliament be the final authority in 
deciding policies which will be framed and executed in part by 
statesmen in no way responsible to British or Irish electorates? It 
would seem to be impossible for a national parliament to exercise ef-
fective control over what in effect will 'he an international executive. 
In the direction of imperial organization, the new Imperial Cabi-
net is established as the comer stone of the new system. And it has 
been recognized both by those opposed and those in favor of an or-
ganization based on the federal idea, that the steps taken signify 
that the development is proceeding on lines away from the plan of an 
imperial federation. 
Nevertheless the problem remains as to how the Imperial Cabinet 
shall be held responsible and to whom. 
The formation of the Allied War Council in the autumn of 1917 
marked another change in political institutions of the highest im-
portance,· with significant effects on the workings of the several allied 
governments. But an international agency of this kind lies outside 
the scope of this study ; an analysis of its actual and probable results 
belongs rather to the field of international problems. 
In operation the new British War Cabinet and Ministry has ap-
peared to be more active and aggressive than the Coalition Cabinet. 
The creation of new ministries showed an attempt to meet the press-
ing problems of the war by new administrative machinery. Some 
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effort was made to deal with the troublesome question of Ireland; 
the problem of parliamentary reform was taken in hand, and the 
bold decision to call an imperial cabinet marked an important step 
towards a more effective organization of the Empire. 
At the same time there has been evidence of internal difficulties 
and some criticism of the new machinery; and a number of changes 
have been made in the War Cabinet and also in the Ministry. In 
May, 1917, Mr. Henderson, the Labour member in the War Cabinet, 
was replaced by Mr. Barnes, while the former was on a mission to 
Russia; and after his return differences with his colleagues led to 
the definitive retirement of Mr. Henderson from the government. 
It appeared· that even before the critical point had been reached, Mr. 
Henderson had not been freely admitted to meetings of the Cabinet; 
but his resignation emphasized the continuation of the principle that 
the members of the Cabinet must be unanimous in their public ex-, 
pressions. 
On the other hand the resignation of Austen Chamberlain as Sec-
retary of State for India (in July, 1917), on the adverse report of 
an investigation into the first Mesopotamian campaign, indicated 
that outside of the new cabinet the individual responsibility of min-
isters was tending to replace the collective responsibility -0f the 
group. Several important changes . in both Cabinet and ministry 
were made at that time. Mr. Bonar Law retired from the War 
Cabinet, though continuing as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir 
Edward Carson was transferred from the Admiralty to the Cabinet 
-changes which further weakened the connection between the Cab-
inet and the HQuse of Commons. Several other changes were made 
in the Ministry, including the return of Winston Churchill to office 
as Minister of Munitions. More recently additional changes have 
been made, both in the War Cabinet and the Ministry. 
In Parliament Mr. Law has not proven a supreme leader; and on 
several occasions Mr. Asquith, from the Opposition bench, has dem-
onstrated his continued leadership of the House, and has saved the 
government in critical situations. 
The meetings of the Imperial Cabinet involved a considerable ad-
dition to the group of five, which had been supposed t~ be an ideal 
number for securing prompt and effective decisions. After the other 
colonial ministers had departed, General Smuts, the representative 
from South Africa, continued to attend sessions of the War Cabi-
net; and this gave rise to question in the House of Commons as to 
his status in the government. 
Practical experience also indicated that it was difficult, if not im-
possible, to divorce general policy from questions of administration. 
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Lord Curzon admitted in the House of Lords that most of the time 
of the War Cabinet was occupied in the adjustment of internal dis-
putes between the ministers. New departments, boards, commis-
sions and committees continued to be established, until the total 
number was more than 300 ;2"' and it became evident that the multi-
plication of such agencies raised as many problems as it solved. 
Questions arose as to the jurisdiction of the Food Controller and the 
President of the Board of Agriculture. The Ministry of Munitions 
became in large part an extension of the former labor conciliation 
department of the Board of Trade. Yet a. new Ministry of Labour 
was created. The Director of the new department of National Serv-
ice resigned because he had nothing to do. The reconstruction com-
mittee practically abandoned its problems; and the proposed new 
Ministry of Reconstruction was generally ridiculed.25 The cre·ation 
of new departments, indeed, involved a process of decentralization 
which contrasted with the policy of centralized control which the 
\Var Cabinet was supposed to typify. 
In the conduct of the war, no broad and coherent policy and no 
effective means of systematic control over the numerous departments 
seem to have been developed. Nor was there, until the end of 1917, 
any approach to a clear definition of satisfactory terms of peace. 
A well known writer views "with some misgiving the recent ar-
rangements by which the Cabinet is to a great extent cut off from 
the great offices which carry on the several branches of the actual 
government, and by which a· secretari~t is interposed between the 
supreme governing committee and those offices. "2a 
Criticism arose in some quarters because the Cabinet did not .con-
fine its attention to war problems. But the unwieldy multiplicity of 
ministries. departments, and other agencies badly needed some bal-
ance wheel ; and the more serious defect was that the Cabinet did 
not prove a sufficiently effective agency of control. 
The problem of administrative organization is not one to be set-
tled by any simple principle or catchword of centralization or de-
centralization. It involves a careful and systematic division of func-
tions, and arrangements for effective co-ordination and correlation 
between the different agencies. 
"See Lists in Parliamc11lary Papers, 1915, Cd. 7855; 1917, Cd. 8741; Liberal Year 
Book, 1917, pp. 148-165; The Nation's Business, Nov., 1917. 
:s New Republic, XII, 90-92 (August a5, 1917). 
:>o Spencer Wilkinson, in Nineteenth Centur::>o, Jan., 1918, p. 45· 
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ASQUITH :MINISTRY AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury .............. . H. H. Asqzsith 
Lord President of the Council ............•.......•........ . Earl Beauchamp 
Chancellor of the Exchequer .................•....... . David Lloyd George 
Ministers without Portfolio .............•........•............... ----
Lord Chancellor .....•...•.......•.........•..........•. Viscount Haldane 
Lord Privy Seal ..........•....•..•••............... .• Marquess of Crewe 
Minister of Munitions .......•.....•...••....................... ----
Secretaries of State: 
Home Office •.........•.................... ...•.•.. Reginald McKenna 
Foreign Affairs .....•....•...•.•...••...•........•. .Sir Edward Grey 
\Var Office ..........•.........•........................ . Earl Kitchener 
Colonial ..•.•..•.•••...•..•...•..•.........•....•.... . Lewis Harcourt 
India •..................•........•.••...•....•... .. Marquess of Crewe 
First I,ord of the Admiralty .....•....•......••.••.•••... Winston q1urchill 
Chief Secretary for Irel~nd ......................•...•.. . Augustine Birrell 
President of the Board of Education ....•.....•........... .Joseph A. Rease 
President of the Ifoard of Agriculture and Fisheries .......•.... . Lord Lucas 
President of the Local Government Board .......•.••.••..• . Herbert Samieel 
President of the Board of Trade ...•....................• Walter Rt1nci111an 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster ....•........ . Edwin Samuel Montagu 
Names in Italics are of members of the Asquith Cabinets. Those in small capitals 
are of members of the new War Cabinet. 
1 Held same position in Asquith Ministry. 
•Resigned in ll!ay. Position vacant until Henry E. Duke was appointed in July. 
•Resigned in May. Position vacant until reappointed in August. 
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COALITION MINISTRY WAR MINISTRY, 
Jum: 3, 1915. DECEMBJ>R 10, 1916. 
H. H. Asquith (L) •••••..•••...•••• DAVID LLOYD GEORGE (L). 
Marquess of Crewe (L) •......••••• EARL CURZON (U). 
Reginald McKenna (L) ••••••..•••• BONAR LAW (U).' 
Marquess of Lansdow11e (U) .•...•• V1scouNT MILNER (U). 
•• • • .•••.•••••••••••••..••.•.•••...• ARTHUR H:END:ERSON (Lab.).G 
•••••..•••••••.•.••.•.••.•.••.•.•••. G:EORGS N. BARNES (Lab.) (May, 
. • . . • . . • • . • • . • • . • • • • • . • • . . • • . • • • • . • • 1917). . 
.••..•..••.••••..•.•••.•.•.•.••..••• SIR EDWARD CARSON (U)' (July, 
••••• .• • •••.•••.. ••• ••• . •• • . •• •.• • .• 1917. 
Lord Buckmaster (L) •.••••.••.•••. Sir Robert B. Finlay (U). 
Earl Curzon (U) ••..........•...... Earl of Crawford (U). 
David Lloyd George (L) •.•....•••.• Dr. Christopher Addison (L). 
Edwin Samuel Montagu (L) (June, Winston Churchill (July, 1917). 
1916) ••.••.....•.•..•.•.••••..• 
Sir Johti A. Simon (L) •••....•••.•. Sir George Cave (U). 
Herbert Samuel (L) (Jan., 1916) •.• 
Sir Edward Grey (L) .............. Arthur J. Balfour (U). 
Earl Kitchener .................... • Earl of Derby (U). 
David Lloyd George (L) (June, 
1916) ••.••.•••••••••.••..•..... 
Bonar Law (U) •................... Walter Long (U). 
Austen Chamberlain (U) .........•• Austen Chamberlain (U). 
Edwin Samuel Montagu (L) (July, 
1917). 
Arthur J. Balfour (U) ........•.•.• Sir Edward Carson (U). 
Sir Eric Geddes (July, 1917). 
A11gustine Birrell (L)x,2 ..•...•.•••• Henry E. Duke (U). 
Henry E. Duke (U) (July, 1916) ••.• 
Arthur Henderson (Lab.) •••.••.•••. Herbert A. L. Fisher. 
Marquess of Crewe (L) (Aug., 1916) 
Lord Selborne ..................... Rowland E. Prothero (U). 
Earl of Craiuford (U) (June, 1916). 
Walter Long (U) ••.••.•.•••..••.•• Lord Rhondda (L). 
W. Ha-yes Fisher (U) (July, 1916) •. 
Walter R1mci111an (L)1 •••••••••••••• Sir Albert Stanley (U). 
Winston Churchill (L) .••.•...•.... Sir Frederick Cawley (L). 
Herbert Samuel (L) (Nov., 1915) .•. 
Edwin S. Montagu (L) (Jan., 1916) 
T. McKimio1i Wood (L) (June, 
1916) ••••••.••.•..•..•...••••... 
'Bonar Law resigned from the War Cabinet and was succeeded by Sir Edward Car· 
son, but continued as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
•Henderson, while on a mission to Russia, was replaced° by Barnes, but never re-
turned to an active part in tltc \\"ar Cabinet. 
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Secretary for Sc~tland .............•..•.•......•. ..... T. McKinnon Wood 
First Commissioner of Works ......•.•...••.......•...•.•. ••• Lord Emmott 
Attorney-General •.•••.•.•••..•...... : ••......•...•... . Sir John A. Simon 
Minister of Blockade ••.......•....................•.....•.•••.• ----
Food Controller ..•.••...••....•...•....•........•.•...........•. ----
Shipping Controller· .........•...•.•• : .•.....•....•....•...•.... ----
Minister of Labour : .•.••.•..•..•....•.••.......•.•••.•..•...... ----
Minister of Pensions •..••••....•..•.....••..•..•.•..•.•••.•.... ----
Air Board ..................•.................•................ ----
War Trade Department ...•.............................•...... ----
Ministry of National Service ...........•••...•................• ----
Ministry of Reconstruction .••.....••...•...............•.•••••• --. --
Postmaster-General ....••.•..•.••.........•.......•.•. . C. E. H. Hobhouse 
Under-Secretaries of State: 
Home Office ..•••.••.....•.•....••.....••.......•.•••••••• Ellis Griffith 
Cecil Harmsworth (Feb., 1915) 
Foreign Affairs ••••.•.....•.••.........•.•••••.•. Francis Dyke"'Acland 
Hon. Neil Primrose (Feb., 1915) 
Colonial Office •.....•..•...•..•.....•.....•••.••••••... Lord Islington 
War Office ....•...•....•....•.•....•..•.•.•..••• Harold John Tennant 
. India •••••.•..••..•••...•.. , ·· .••..•..••.........•..•..•• C. H. Roberts 
Parliamentary Secretaries: to the Admiralty .....•...••..•.. T. J. Macnamara 
Board of Education •..•........•............•• Dr. Christopher Addison 
Board of Trade •..••..•.•••.............•..•.••...•.•. J. M. Robertson 
Local Government Board ••....••.•..•...•.•.••...•.. • ]. Herbert Lewis 
Treasury •..••.......•.••.•........•...•.......•••••. Percy Illingworth 
John W. Gulland (Feb., 1915) 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury •..••.••••••••.•. Edwin Samuel Montagu 
Francis Dyke Acland (Feb., 1915) 
Parliamentary Secretary to Munitions Department ..••••.....•••• ----
Q 
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T. McKinnon Wood (L)1 ........... Robert Munro (L). 
Harold John Tennant (L) (June, 
1916) ......................... . 
Lewis V. Harcourt (L) ............ Sir Alfred M. Mond (L). 
Sir Edward Carson (U) ..••.••••••. Sir Frederick E. Smith (U). 
Sir Frederick E. Smith (U) (Oct., 
1915) ......................... . 
--- ........................... Lord Robert Cecil (U). 
Lord Robert Cecil (U) (Feb., 1916). 
--- ........................... Lord Devonport (L). 
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--- ........................... Lord Rhondda (L) (June, 1917). 
--- ........................... Sir Joseph Paton Maclay. 
--- .................... : ...... John Hodge (Lab.). 
--- ........................... George N. Barnes (Lab.). 
Arthur Henderson (Lab.) (Nov., 
1916) ........................ .. 
---· ........................... Viscount Cowdray. 
Maj. Baird (July, 1916) ........... .. 
--- ...•...•...•••...••.•.•••.. Lord Emmott. 
Walter Clive Bridgeman (U) (July, Assist.-Capt. Visct. Walmer (U). 
1916) ........................ .. 
--- ........................... Neville Chamberlain. 
--- ........................... Dr. C. Addison (July, 1917). 
Herbert Samuel (L) .••...•...••.• Albert Holden Illingworth (L). 
J. A. Pease (L) (Jan., 1916) ........ 
William Brace (Lab.) ............... William Brace (Lab.). 
Lord Robert Cecil (U) ............. Lord Robert Cecil (U). 
Additional-Lord Hardinge. 
Arthur D. Steel-Maitland (U) ...... Arthur D. Steel-Maitland (U). 
Harold John Tennant (L)1 .......... J. Ian Macpherson, 
Earl of Derby (U) (June, 1916) .. .. 
Lord Islington (L) ................. Lord Islington (L). 
T. J. Macnamara (L) .............. T. J. Macnamara (L).1 
Additional-Earl Lytton (U). 
J. Herbert Lewis (L) ..•.••.•.•..•. J. Herbert Lewis (L). 
Ernest George Pretyman (U) .•.•..• G. H. Roberts Lab.). 
William Hayes Fisher (U) .•.•••••.. William Hayes ·Fisher (U). 
John W. Gulland (L)1 .............. Lord Edmund Talbot (U). 
Lord Edmund Talbot (U) .......... Capt. F. E. Guest (L) 
(Mar., 1917). 
Edwin Samuel Montagu (L) •...•.•. Sir S. H. Lever. 
Dr. Christopher Addison (L) ....... Mr. Kellaway (L). 
Sir Worthington Evans (U). 
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Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture ...... Sir Harry Verney 
Financial Secretary to the War Office ....•.....••..... Harold Trevor Baker 
Junior Lord of the Treasuhy ....•.. John W. Gulland (went out Feb., 1915) 
Junior Lord of the Treasury ..................•.....•.. W. Wedgwood Benn 
Junior Lord of the Treasury ..........•..•..................• William Jones 
Junior Lord of the Treasury ........•.....................•.•....• H. Webb 
Junior Lord of the Treasury ...................••. Walter Rea (Feb., 1915) 
Junior Lord of the Treasury .....•....... ." ...... _ .•. Cecil Beck (Feb., 1915) 
Civil Lord of the Admiralty ............•.......•..•.••..... George Lambert 
Solicitor-General ....•...........•...•.•........... Sir Stanley Buckmaster 
Paymaster-General .......................................... Lord Strachie 
Assistant Postmaster-General ..........••....•.......... Capt. Cecil Norton 
Parliamentary Secretaries: to the National Service Ministry ...... ----
Air Board •.....••...........•.•..•••••...•...............•. ----
Food Control Ministry ..•...•.............................. ----
Minister of Pensions ...........•.•....•.................•.. ----
Shipping Controller .....•..•.....•.................••.•..•• ----
Minister of Blockades ............•...•.•..••..•.•......•••. ----
Minister of Labour ........•......•.....•.....•.........•.. ----
Assistant Under-Secretary Foreign Affairs •......•...•.••.••..•.• ----
Scotland: 
Secretary for ......•....•..•..............•..... .• T. McKinnon Wood 
Lord Advocate ..........•.•...•...•.•.........••..••.•. Robert Munro 
Solicitor-General •.•.•.....•..•.•.••.•.•••..... Thomas Brash Morison 
Ireland: 
Lord Lieutenant •..•..•..••.....•...••••••..•••...... Earl of Aberdeen 
Lord Wimborne (Feb., 1915) 
Chief Secretary ......••........•.••............•..• . Augustine Birrell 
Lord Chancellor .....................•......••...•• Ignatius J. O'Brien 
Attorney-General .....••.•..•.••.•..•..............••..•. Jonathan Pim 
Solicitor-General .........• ; .••........•...•.•••.•..•. James O'Connor 
0 
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Francis Dyke Acland (L) •..••.•..• Sir R. Winfrey {L). 
Duke of Marlborough. 
Henry William Forster (U) ••.••..• Henry William Forster (U). 
Geoffrey Howard (L) •.•.•.•••••••. James F. Hope (U). 
G. H. Roberts (Lab.) ••.••••••••••.• J. W. Pratt (L). 
Walter Clive Br.idgeman (U) •••.•.• Stanley Baldwin (U). 
Walter Rea (L) ••.••••••••.•.•...•• James Parker (Lab.). 
Towyn Jones (L). 
Duke of Devonshire •••••••••••••••• Ernest George Pretyman (U). 
Sir Arthur Lee (June, 1916) •••••••• 
Earl Lytton (U) (Oct., 1916) ••••••• 
Sir Frederick E. Smith (U) •••••••• Sir Gordon Hewart (L). 
Sir George Cave (U) (Oct., 1915) •• 
Lord Newton ..••.•....••.•.••••••• Sir J. Compton-Rickett. 
Arthur Henderson (Lab.) (Oct., 
1916} •••....•.•.••••••••••••••• 
~-- .....•.....••••••••..•••••. H. Pike Pease (U). 
--- •••••.........•.......•••.. Stephen Walsh. 
--- .•.•........•.•••••..••••.. Maj. Baird. . 
--- •....................•.••.. Capt. Charles Bathurst (U). 
--- ............•.............. Col. Sir Arthur Griffith Boscawen 
(U). 
--- .....................•.••.• Sir L. G. Chiozza Money (L). 
--- ..•............•..•.••..•.• Rt. Hon. F. Leverton Harris (U). 
---.•.•.•......•.•.•...•..••••• Walter Clive Bridgeman (U). 
Lord Newton (Oct., 1916) •••••••••• Lord Newton. 
T. McKinnon Wood (L)1 ••••••••••• Robert Munro (L). 
Harold John Tennant (L) (June, 
1916) •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Robert Munro (L)1 ••••••••••••••••• James A. Clyde (U). 
Thomas Brash Morison (L)1 •••••••• Thomas Brash Morison (L).1 
Lord Wimborne (L)' .•..••••••....• Lord Wimborne (L). 
Augustine Birrell, 1, 2 ••••••••••••••• Henry E. Duke (U). 
Henry E. Duke (U) (July, 1916) •••• 
Ignatius J. O'Brien (L)1 •••••••••••• Ignatius J. O'Brien (L).1 
John Gordon (U) .••••.••.••••••••• James O'Connor (L). 
J. H. M. Campbell (March, 1916) ••• 
James O'Connor (L)1 ••••••••••••••• James Chambers (U). 
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Ministers of the Royal Household: 
Lord Steward •••.....••.................••.••.•..• Earl of Chesterfield 
Treasurer •.•.•.••..•••...••. ; •....•.•.•.....•. Capt Hon. F. E. Guest 
Comptroller •.•...•..•..•••.....•..•.••..••.••••..• Lord Saye and Sele 
Lord Chamberlain •....•........•.•.•••••...•..••••••.. Lord Sandhurst 
Vice-Chamberlain .....••..•............••....•• Hon. Geoffrey Howard 
Lord in Waiting ••.•....••....•...••......•.•....•..••• Lord Herscheli 
Lord in Waiting ......•..•••..•.........•.•..•....•••.. Lord Allendale 
Lord in Waiting ..•............••.•....••••••...••.••.• Lord Stanmore 
Lord in Waiting ..•.......•...••.......•.•..••..••. Lord Ranksborough 
Lord in Waiting .•.••..•......••....••..•....••.•.....•. Lord Granville 
Lord in Waiting •.••••••.•...••..••.•.•....•.•...•..••..••. Lord Acton 
Captain of Gentlemen-at-Arms .•...••....••.•.......•• Lord Colebrooke 
Captain of Yeomen of Guard ............•.............. Earl of Craven 
Master of the Horse ...•...•.•.•........••..........•.. Earl of Granard 
If an outsider may venture an opinion, there is need for a still 
more radical reorganization of the British administrative system, 
affecting not only the Cabinet, but the numerous ministerial depart-
ments. The number of main departments should be reduced; and 
the less important services organized within one or the other of the . 
main departments. For example, it might be welJ to combine the 
ministries of foreign and colonial affairs. There could be a single 
ministry of military operations, embracing the army, the navy, the 
air service, and the munitions service. A comprehensive ministry 
of home or internal affairs might absorb the functions of the Home 
Secretary, the Local Government Board, the Board of Agriculture 
and the Food Controller. A ministry of trade and commerce could 
take over the work of the Board of Trade and the Shipping Con-
troller. 
If the number of main departments were thus reduced to ten or 
twelve, many of the con~icts between what are now distinct minis-
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tries could. be settled within the department. A Cabinet of workable 
size could then be set up, including the ministers at the head of each 
of the main departments, with the Prime Minister as the general di-
rector of the whole system. Such a Cabinet might combine the ad-
vantages of centralized control aimed at in the Lloyd George govern-
ment with those of the old Cabinet system, which linked the central 
council with the administrative services and with Parliament. 
Such an organization would also lend itself to the further devel-
opment of imperial organization. The five or six ministers dealing 
with imperial problems could sit with the colonial premiers and a 
representative from India in an imperial cabinet which would also 
be small enough for effective results ; while imperial con£ erences 
held from time to time with more representatives from the overseas 
dominions would form a deliberative agency for the consideration 
of larger questions of policy. 
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